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COMMENTS
APPLICATION OF THE GOOD-FAITH-DOUBT
TEST TO THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONTINUED MAJORITY STATUS
OF INCUMBENT UNIONS
The National Labor Relations Act' embodies two often-conflicting
policy objectives: the promotion of industrial stability2 and the max-
imization of employee free choice. 3 Underlying the Act is the assump-
tion that industrial stability is best achieved by maintaining continuity
in collective bargaining relationships. The policy objective of em-
ployee free choice is governed by the principle of majority rule.4 Em-
ployees decide whether to engage in collective bargaining with their
employer, and, if they decide to bargain collectively, they choose a bar-
gaining representative. Such basic decisions are the essence of em-
ployee free choice. 5
The National Labor Relations Board is primarily responsible for
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Section 1 sets forth this basic policy of the Act:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption,
and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working condi-
tions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
Id § 151.
3. Section 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and-to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....
Id § 157.
4. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), codifies the majority-rule principle:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ... ." Id § 159(a).
5. The two basic policies underlying the Act are stated succinctly in the concluding para-
graph of section 1:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of col-
lective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
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balancing these two competing policy considerations.6 This comment
examines the Board's balancing in the context of an employer's refusal
to bargain with an incumbent union7 that the employer has recognized
for at least one year.8 This comment argues that the Board has maxi-
mized industrial stability at the expense of employee free choice by
placing an unduly heavy burden on the employer to prove that the in-
cumbent union no longer commands the majority support of the em-
ployee unit. The employer is the party least able to bear this burden;
therefore the union, and not the employer, should be the party obli-
gated to prove majority status.
The incumbent-union situation highlights the conflict between free
choice and stability. When industrial stability is favored over em-
ployee free choice, incumbent unions become more entrenched even if
they are not supported by a majority of unit employees. This result is
contrary not only to the goal of employee free choice, but also to the
language of the Act.9 The Board's current standard requires employers
to disprove the majority status of incumbent unions. Employers should
have to prove only a good-faith doubt of the incumbent union's major-
ity status, not an actual loss of majority support. Once the employer
has shown a good-faith doubt, the union should be required to prove its
majority status to preserve continued employer recognition.
I. THE EvOLUTION OF THE GOOD-FAITH-DOUBT TEST
Over the years the Board has struggled to develop clear standards
to guide employers in their relationship with incumbent unions. The
issue confronting the Board is under what circumstances an employer
can discontinue his bargaining relationship with an incumbent union
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid
or protection.
Id § 151.
6. See id § 153.
7. In this comment the term "incumbent union" means a union that the employer already
has recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employee unit.
8. The standards governing an employer's refusal to bargain with a union during the
union's initial year of recognition differ from those employed by the Board after that period. See
notes 14-20 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 4supra. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), can be read narrowly
to mean that once a majority of unit employees "select or designate" the union, the union need not
command majority support. This static interpretation, which fails to take into account changes in
circumstance, renders employees' section 7 rights meaningless once the employees select a union.
The better interpretation recognizes that, except in limited situations, bargaining representatives
must command majority support. For a discussion of the limited situations in which the union
should not have to show majority support, see notes 115-21 itnfa and accompanying text.
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without violating sections 8(a)(5)10 and 8(a)(1)" of the Act. Inconsis-
tent Board decisions and conflicting court decisions evidence the disa-
greement over this issue.
Celanese Corp. ofAmerica12 represents one of the Board's earliest
attempts to formulate explicit guidelines in this context. In Celanese
the employer refused to bargain with a union that had been certified in
a Board-conducted election as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employee unit. The election had occurred over three years
before the refusal to bargain, and the employer argued that the union
had since lost its majority support. To justify his contention, the em-
ployer pointed to the significant reduction in the size of the bargaining
unit since the certification.' 3 In response to the employer's refusal to
bargain, the union filed charges with the Board alleging violations of
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act.
First, the Board reviewed the principles applicable to a union
whose certification is less than a year old. During the one-year certifi-
cation period the union is presumed conclusively to command majority
support;14 absent unusual circumstances, 5 the employer must bargain
with the union for at least one year, even if the union loses its majority
status. Then the Board held that the presumption continues after the
one-year period, but becomes rebuttable. 16 To rebut the presumption,
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of a majority of employees within the bar-
gaining unit.
11. Id § 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
Id See note 3 supra. Any violation of sections 8(a)(2)-(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2)-(5) (1976), is
also a derivative violation of section 8(a)(1).
12. 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
13. Id at 670. The reduction in unit size occurred during an economic strike called by the
union. While many of the employees were on strike, the employer updated his production meth-
ods, thereby eliminating a number of unit jobs, and hired an independent contractor to perform
other unit work.
14. Id at 671-72. Celanese involved a union that had been certified in a Board-conducted
election. Such an election is not the sole method through which a union can obtain recognition
from the employer. The employer may voluntarily recognize a union that is supported by a ma-
jority of the employees in the bargaining unit. The irrebuttable presumption of majority support,
known as the "certification-year rule," applies to uncertified unions for a "reasonable period,"
usually one year. The Supreme Court approved the certification-year rule in Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954).
15. "Unusual circumstances" have been found only: (1) when a union has become defunct,
(2) when a schism has developed within the union, and (3) when there has been a rapid fluctuation
in the size of the bargaining unit. See Seger, The Majority Stata of Incumbent Bargaining Repre-
sentatives, 47 TuL. L. REv. 961, 966-78 (1973).
16. 95 N.L.R.B. at 672. The rebuttable presumption of majority support establishes a prima
facie case that an employer must bargain with an incumbent union. Terrell Mach. Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
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the employer must show a good-faith belief that the union has lost its
majority status:
[W]hether the [employer] violated Section 8(a)(5) ... depends, not
on whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of
the Union's continuing majority status or to demonstrate that the
Union in fact did not represent the majority of the employees, but
upon whether the Employer in goodfaith believed that the Union no
longer represented the majority of the employees.17
Whether the employer has shown sufficient good-faith doubt in a
particular case depends on the circumstances.1 8 In Celanese, however,
the Board identified two essential considerations: (1) the employer
must have a reasonable basis in fact for doubting the union's majority
status, 19 and (2) the employer cannot refuse to bargain with a union
when the employer has committed unfair labor practices that under-
mine the union's majority support.20 The Board in Celanese held that
the employer had satisfied the good-faith-doubt standard and found no
reason to inquire into the union's actual majority status.21 The em-
ployer was therefore under no duty to bargain with the union until the
union could again demonstrate majority support.
The dissenting Board members in Celanese argued that an em-
ployer's good-faith doubt is irrelevant and that the issue should be
whether the union actually enjoys majority status. 22 This reasoning
was not long ignored, and in Stoner Rubber Co. 23 the Board modified
its approach. In Stoner the employer refused to bargain two months
after the union's certification year had expired. The employer claimed
that the union no longer commanded majority support. The employer
gave several reasons for his contention: the union had won the certifi-
The presumption applies equally to certified and voluntarily recognized unions. Bartenders, Ho-
tel, Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651-52 (1974).
17. 95 N.L.R.B. at 671 (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 673.
19. Id The term "good-faith doubt" is a misnomer, because the standard is objective as well
as subjective. A more appropriate term would be "good-faith-reasonable doubt." The Board and
the courts have used the term "good-faith doubt" though recognizing the objective component of
the test. This comment will do likewise.
20. This is the antithesis of good faith. The employer may not undermine the union's major-
ity status through his own unfair labor practices and then defend against a section 8(a)(5) charge,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), by alleging the union's loss of majority support. NLRB v. Little
Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1969); see Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 702 (1944).
21. 95 N.L.RB. at 675.
22. The dissent stated: "Certainly it does not follow from the fact that one has the right to
rebut a presumption by showing that a different status obtains, that it is sufficient to overcome the
presumed status to show that one has good faith doubts as to the truth of the presumption." Id
(Houston & Murdock, Members, dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
23. 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
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cation election by only five votes; several employees had complained
about the union; no negotiating had taken place for five months in the
wake of an economic strike; and only eighteen former strikers and
eighteen permanent strikers' replacements remained to operate the
plant.
24
The Board in Stoner reconsidered its approach to the issue of an
incumbent union's majority status:
Proof of majority is peculiarly within the special competence of the
union. It may be proved by signed authorization cards, dues check-
off cards, membership lists, or any other evidentiary means. An em-
ployer can hardly prove that a union no longer represents a majority
since he does not have access to the union's membership lists and
direct interrogation of employees would probably be unlawful as
well as of dubious validity. Accordingly, to overcome the presump-
tion of majority the employer need only produce sufficient evidence
to cast serious doubt on the union's continued majority status. The
presumption then loses its force and the General Counsel must come
forward with evidence that on the refusal-to-bargain date the union
in fact did represent a majority of employees in the appropriate
unit.25
The Board dismissed the union's complaint because the employer had
produced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of majority sup-
port and the Board's General Counsel, aided by the union, had not
attempted to prove actual majority status.26
The effect of proving good-faith doubt distinguishes Celanese and
Stoner. Under Celanese, good-faith doubt is a complete defense to an
unlawful refusal-to-bargain charge.27 Under Stoner, however, a show-
ing of good-faith doubt merely rebuts the union's presumption of ma-
jority support, compelling the General Counsel to prove actual
majority status.28 These differing standards affect the employer's evi-
dentiary burden. Theoretically, the employer's burden is the same
under both standards: to prove good-faith doubt. But in practice the
Board has placed a stronger evidentiary burden on the employer under
24. Id at 1442.
25. Id at 1445 (emphasis in original).
26. Id at 1446. The Board and the courts have held that the terms "good-faith doubt" and
"serious doubt" are identical in meaning. See NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828, 829 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1975);
Bartenders, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 653
(1974). The Stoner case, however, signaled a significant reduction in the amount of evidence
required from the employer to show good-faith doubt.
27. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
28. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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the Celanese standard.29 Board decisions suggest that this burden is
now so heavy that in effect, the employer must affirmatively prove the
union's loss of majority status.30 Under Stoner, however, the issues of
majority support and good-faith doubt are separate. If the employer
first shows good-faith doubt, the General Counsel, on behalf of the
union, then bears the burden of proving majority status.31
Recent Board decisions have moved away from the Stoner ration-
ale in favor of the Celanese approach. Under current Board standards
good-faith doubt is a complete defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge,
though the employer's burden of showing good-faith doubt is heavy.
In Automated Business Systems, 32 for example, the Board expressly re-
pudiated the portion of Stoner that held that a showing of good-faith
doubt is not a complete defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge.33 More
29. See, e.g., Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980); Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357
(1976), enforced, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
30. See Guerdon Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 658, 664 (1975) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting)
(the Board's standard places an impossible burden upon the employer to prove a negative); R.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 114
(1976) ("a Board finding that the doubt is supportable is generally tantamount to a finding that the
union did not in fact have majority support").
In a recently filed petition for certiorari, the attorneys for the employer framed one of their
questions substantially as follows: May the NLRB establish a rebuttable presumption to which it
gives mere lip service and that in actual practice is an absolute and irrebuttable presumption
resulting in a denial of due process? Silver Spur Casino v. NLRB, 49 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Oct. 11,
1980) (No. 80-660) (petition for certiorari), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1973 (1981).
31. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
32. 205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973), enforcement denied, 497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974).
33. The Board's treatment of its previous holding in Stoner was blunt:
[I]f... Stoner Rubber were taken literally, it would mean that even where an employer
demonstrates a reasonably based doubt of the union's continuing majority ... he will
have violated Section 8(a)(5) if the General Counsel is able to prove that the majority in
fact continued. That would indeed be a major departure from existing law.
Id at 535 (footnote omitted). The last sentence is curious because the Board had never expressly
overruled Stoner and had recently followed it in Taft Broadcasting, 201 N.L.R.B. 801 (1973).
Current Board decisions still use the term "good-faith doubt," and hold that a showing of
good-faith doubt rebuts the presumption of majority support. See Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716
(1980). Considering that good-faith doubt also is held to be a complete defense to a refusal-to
-bargain charge, the contradiction in the Board's approach is immediately apparent. To say that
good-faith doubt is both a complete defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge and that it also rebuts
the presumption of majority support means that a complete defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge
is made out by merely rebutting the presumption of majority support. 'The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence provide, however, that once a presumption is rebutted a complete defense is not made out;
rather, the opposing party must satisfy its burden of proof. FED. R. EvlD. 301 states that:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such
party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976) requires the Board to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence "so far as
practicable" in unfair labor practice proceedings. It has been argued correctly that the Board's
current standard is not in accord with Rule 301. See Note, NLRB Determination of Incumbent
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recently, in Pennco, Inc. 34 the Board justified the employer's heavy evi-
dentiary burden as necessary to effectuate the dual policies of industrial
stability and employee free choice.35
-The Stoner and Celanese approaches also differ sharply in their
treatment of the employer's evidence. The employer's evidence is pro-
bative under the Stoner approach if it tends to show that the employer
has a good-faith doubt about the union's majority support. Under Ce-
lanese, though the "good-faith doubt" language is used, evidence tend-
ing to show good-faith doubt is not probative unless it also tends to
prove actual loss of majority support. This distinction explains the dis-
parate treatment the courts of appeals accord employers.
II. THE SPLIT AMONG THE COURTS OF APPEALS ON THE
GOOD-FAITH-DOUBT ISSUE
Most courts have adopted the Stoner language that actual majority
status, rather than good-faith doubt, is the ultimate issue.36 Some of
these courts, however, place an evidentiary burden on the employer
that is more in accordance with Celanese, despite their ostensible ad-
herenc to Stoner.37
Unions'Majory Status, 54 IND. L.. 651, 660-61 (1979). The Board could alleviate a great deal of
confusion by stating explicitly that the good-faith-doubt standard is merely a device to shift the
ultimate burden of proof to the employer.
34. 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980).
35. The Board stated that "in light of the dual policies underlying the presumption, the em-
ployer's burden is a heavy one." Id at 717. It described the dual policies as follows:
The presumption of.continuing majority status essentially serves two important func-
tions of Federal labor policy. First, it pr6motes continuity in bargaining relationships
.... The resulting industrial stability remains a primary objective of the Wagner Act,
and to an even greater extent, the Taft-Hartley Act .... Second, the presumption of
continuing majority status protects the express statutory right of employees to designate
a collective bargaining representative of their own choosing, and to prevent an employer
from impairing that right without some objective evidence that the representative the
employees have designated no longer enjoys majority support.
Id at 716-17.
36. E.g., Bellwood Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 98, 102 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1973 (1981); W & W
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 934, 939 (10th Cir. 1979); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,
594 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1979); Automated Business Syss. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262, 269-72 (6th
Cir. 1974); Lodges 1746 & 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
809, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1970). Contra, NLRB v. Dayton Motels,
Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 1973). The courts may feel compelled to follow Stoner because of
the constraints imposed upon them by FED. R. EvD. 301, which provides expressly that a pre-
sumption does not alter the burden of proof. See note 33 supra.
37. See NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 579 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 1973 (1981); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence must be
"clear, cogent, and convincing"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); J. Ray McDermott & Co. v.
NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 858-59 (5th Cir.) (evidence tested by a high standard of objectivity), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir.
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Two recent cases highlight this dichotomy. In each case the Board
held that the employer failed to prove good-faith doubt, and entered a
bargaining order.38 In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc. 39 the employer
based his claim of good-faith doubt on employee statements of discon-
tent with the union,4° a high employee turnover rate,4' a lack of union
activity in processing grievances, 42 other evidence of union inactivity,43
a low rate of union membership, 44 union financial difficulties, 45 a good
bargaining history between the union and the employer,46 and union
admissions of lack of membership. 47
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence
was insufficient to prove the employer's claim of good-faith doubt, re-
marking that no single item clearly showed a decline in union sup-
port.48 The court considered evidence of employee statements of
dissatisfaction too ambiguous to support a finding of good-faith doubt.
This conclusion accords with prior Board decisions.49 Similarly, the
1975) (employer must be prepared to meet a high standard of proof). The Board's findings of fact
are conclusive "if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). The courts therefore are constrained in their judicial review of Board
findings of fact. Some courts, however, have followed the Stoner approach and have more readily
denied enforcement of Board orders. See Bellwood Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 98 (7th
Cir. 1980); W & W Steel Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979); National Car Rental Sys.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1979).
38. Bellwood Gen. Hosp., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 88 (1979), enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 98 (7th
Cir. 1980); Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357 (1976), enforced, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
39. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
40. Id at 305-06. Most of these statements were remarks, overheard by the employer's man-
ager, that the union could do nothing for the employees. 227 N.L.R.B. 359, 361 (1976) (decision of
administrative law judge, which the Board adopted). In Nevada Lodge, a case consolidated with
Tahoe Nugget, the employee statements were more akin to direct repudiations of the union. Some
employees stated to the employer's general manager that they were uninterested in and uncon-
cerned with the union. Id at 371.
41. 584 F.2d at 306. In Tahoe Nugget the turnover rate was 80% per year. 227 N.L.R.B. at
366. In Nevada Lodge the rate was estimated at 100% per year. Id at 376.
42. 584 F.2d at 307.
43. Id Union officials inspected the business premises infrequently and no employees at-
tended a union meeting of employees in the Lake Tahoe area.
44. Id The extent of union membership in the particular businesses was unclear. A former
union president testified that there were approximately 1000 union members out of approximately
30,000 employees in the Lake Tahoe and Reno areas. 227 N.L.R.B. at 370.
45. 584 F.2d at 307. The union had been placed in trusteeship.
46. Id at 307-08.
47. Id at 308.
48. Id
49. See Pick-Mt. Laurel Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1261 (1979); Valley Nitrogen Producers,
Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 208, 214 (1973). But see Hayworth Roll & Panel Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 604, 606
(1961) (the Board considered employee expressions of dissatisfaction over paying dues as evidence
supporting good-faith doubt). See also NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 224-25 (9th Cir.
1979).
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court considered the high turnover rate too equivocal to support a find-
ing of good-faith doubt. The court followed established Board prece-
dent in applying the "ancillary-ratio presumption": that new
employees support the union in the same ratio as those they replace.50
The court also followed the traditional Board approach of rejecting evi-
dence of union inactivity,5' noting that no testimony indicated that
there were grievances that the union should have processed.52 The evi-
dence of low union affiliation was deemed only marginally relevant be-
cause it was never tied to the particular units of employees in
question.53 The court agreed with the Board's basic premise that union
membership is not equivalent to union support because employees may
desire union representation but refuse to support the union
50. Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement deniedon other grounds,
359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966). The Board relies on the ancillary-ratio presumption to maintain
industrial stability, probably surmising that without the presumption majority status constantly
would be open to attack after the certification year. Courts have used this presumption when the
employee turnover occurred in the normal course of business. See Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB,
581 F.2d 767, 771-72 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); NLRB v. Little Rock
Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 302 F.2d 342,
345 (7th Cir. 1962). Some courts, however, have found that evidence of employee turnover tends
to prove good-faith doubt. See NLRB v. Alvin J. Bart & Co., 598 F.2d 1267, 1271 (2d Cir. 1979)
(11 out of 14 employees replaced); Dalewood Rehabilitation Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 77, 80
(9th Cir. 1977) (90% employee turnover); National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189, 195
(8th Cir. 1974) (32% employee turnover).
Only in the most extreme circumstances will the Board consider evidence of employee turn-
over as probative of good-faith doubt. For instance, the Board has applied the ancillary-ratio
presumption to strikers' replacements, thereby concluding that strikers' replacements support the
union in the same ratio as the employees who are out on strike. See Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B.
716 (1980); Burlington Homes, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 103 L.R.R.M. 1116 (Dec. 14, 1979);
Servomation, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 975, 978 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
criticized the application of this presumption to strikers' replacements as "not specifically author-
ized by statute" and "far from reality." National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203,
1206 (8th Cir. 1979). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, however, that the
Board's application of the presumption to strikers' replacements is justified. See NLRB v.
Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 814 (2d Cir. 1978). But see Note, The
Strikers'Replacem ents Presumption and an Employer's Duty to Bargain with the Incumbent Union,
21 B.C.L. Rnv. 455 (1980).
51. The courts have considered evidence of union inactivity to support good-faith doubt
more readily than the Board. See Pioneer Inn Assocs. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir.
1978) (evidence of union inactivity considered but rejected as too weak); Printing Pressmen &
Offset Workers Local 51 v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1978) (evidence of the union's
failure to police the union-security provision of the collective bargaining agreement for seven to
nine months supported good-faith doubt); Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 945,
947 (10th Cir. 1977) (that only one grievance was filed in a one-year period was considered as
evidence). But see Viking Lithographers, Inc., 184 N.L.RB. 139, 139 (1970) (total lack of union
activity for four months supported good-faith doubt).
52. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921
(1979).
53. Id. See note 44 supra.
Vol. 1981:7181 PRESUMPTION OF MAJORITY STATUS 727
financially.5 4 Likewise, the union's financial difficulties and the em-
ployer-union bargaining history were considered only equivocal evi-
dence of loss of support.55 Finally, the court found that the union's
admissions of lack of membership were not damaging to the union's
position because the admissions concerned only union membership,
not union support.5 6 Because the court was unable to find any single
item clearly showing a decline in union support,57 it held that the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove good-faith doubt.
The Tahoe Nugget court apparently expected the employer to
prove the union's actual loss of majority status, not merely its own
good-faith doubt.5 8 All of the evidence the court considered, both indi-
54. See Servomation, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 975, 978 (1978); United Supermarkets, Inc., 214
N.L.R.B. 958, 958 (1974) ("that less than a majority of the unit employees may have authorized
dues checkoffs is immaterial to the issue of majority status"); Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
1480, 1481 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
A former Board member criticized this premise as "ascribing a free rider mentality to the
majority of the American workmen." Guerdon Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 658, 664 (1975) (Ken-
nedy, Member, dissenting). Although many courts have agreed with the Board, e.g., Retired Per-
sons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1975); Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d
1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d
588, 592 (5th Cir. 1966), some courts have considered evidence of low union membership, at least
when combined with other evidence. See, e.g., NLRB v. Triplett Corp., 619 F.2d 586 (6th Cir.
1980); Star Mfg. Co., Div. of Star Forge, Inc. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1976); National
Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974).
The Board will consider evidence of low union membership when there has been a drastic
reduction in dues checkoffs by the employees in the unit. E.g., Convair Div. of Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 131, 134-35 (1968) (sudden decrease in checkoffs from 36% to 26% of employ-
ees). A large group of employees probably would simultaneously stop paying dues only if they
collectively were repudiating the union as their bargaining representative.
55. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
921 (1979).
56. Union statements of lack of support may in some cases be determinative of the issue of
good-faith doubt. If a union official admits that the union no longer commands majority support,
this admission may be enough to prove good-faith doubt. See Lodges 1746 & 743, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 809, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (admission of
union's attorney considered important evidence showing good-faith doubt), cer. denied, 396 U.S.
1058 (1970).
Problems of ambiguity, however, are prevalent in this context. In Harvey's Wagon Wheel,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1978), enforced, 640 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1980), for example, a union
official had stated that the union was "in trouble." The Board commented as follows: "[A] re-
mark of [this] type ... is not an admission that the Union no longer represented a majority of
unit employees .... Its implication is, at most, an admission of financial difficulties and difficul-
ties in the collection of dues." Id at 1671 n.3 (citation omitted).
57. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 308 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921
(1979). The court stated: "Some of the evidence is subjective; the inferences of loss of Union
support are ambiguous. Before unilaterally disrupting the bargaining relationship, an employer
must obtain more reliable evidence of lost support." Id.
58. The language the court used supports this position. The court searched for evidence that
was "clearly referable to a loss of support," id, rather than evidence tending to provide a reason-
able basis to doubt the union's majority status. See Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 553,
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vidually and cumulatively, may have been only marginally probative
of actual loss of support. The evidence did, however, have more proba-
tive value on the issue of good-faith doubt. If the court had used the
employer's evidence to decide only this issue, the cumulative weight of
all the evidence would have been substantial. It is certainly possible
that the employer in Tahoe Nugget reasonably and in good faith
doubted that the union had majority support. The Tahoe Nugget court
and the Board opted for the Celanese approach, however, interpreting
the good-faith-doubt test to require the employer to disprove actual
majority status.5 9
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Bell-
wood General Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 carefully distinguished the
good-faith-doubt test from the issue of actual majority status. The Bell-
wood court considered evidence similar to that presented by the em-
ployer in Tahoe Nugget. The employer sought to establish good-faith
doubt based on a seventy-percent employee turnover rate since certifi-
cation, employee statements of dissatisfaction with the union, absence
of properly elected union officers, low attendance at union meetings,
lack of grievance activity, and the union's failure to have representa-
tives visit the hospital or to use a bulletin board that the hospital pro-
vided.61
557 (9th Cir. 1980) ("before refusing to bargain with a union, an employer should have before it
evidence which unequivocally indicates that the union no longer has the majority support of the
employees"), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2317 (1981). Concededly, there is room for argument that the
court was using the good-faith-doubt test, albeit in a highly objective manner. Holding an em-
ployer to an impossible standard of objectivity is no better than expecting him affirmatively to
prove loss of support. The Tahoe Nugget court failed to recognize that the employer was not in a
position to come forward with better evidence. Courts must view the strength of the employer's
evidence in light of the employer's limited access to evidence of loss of support.
59. Although generally the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has followed the Board's
approach, the court has expressed reservations. In NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1973 (1981), the court, while enforcing the Board's bargaining
order, recognized that the Board may have made the presumption of majority support too difficult
to rebut. 623 F.2d at 581. In Dalewood Rehabilitation Hosp., Inc., v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 77 (9th
Cir. 1977), the court refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order, finding that it was not sup-
ported by "substantial evidence considering the record as a whole." Id at 80.
60. 627 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1980).
61. Id at 103-04. The variety of evidence that an employer can provide produces complex
situations which the Board must weigh in accordance with its standards. The evidence did not
materially differ in Bellwood and Tahoe Nugget; the Board imposed a bargaining order in both
cases. The cases turn on the differing approaches of the two courts.
In considering the problem of weighing different evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit explained that "[tihe problem with this case-by-case approach is that
both the employer and the Union are subject to the shifting views of the members of the Board
and the courts as to what evidence is sufficiently 'objective' and convincing to demonstrate a good
faith doubt." Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court further
stated that "[a] standard under which such small factual differences are decisive seems question-
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Rather than use the analysis suggested by Tahoe Nugget, the Bell-
wood court adopted an approach closer to Stoner. Throughout its
analysis the Bellwood court distinguished between proving good-faith
doubt and proving actual loss of support. This approach enabled the
employer's evidence to accumulate substantial weight:62
Even were we to agree . . . that some of the individual elements
might not, in themselves, justify a good faith doubt, or even that the
sum total of the evidence might not support a finding that the Union
had, in fact, lost its majority status ... we think the record without
reasonable dispute indicates that the Hospital had sufficient objective
evidence before it on which to base a reasonable doubt of the
Union's continued majority support. The Hospital's presentation
was sufficient, at least, to shift the burden to the General Counsel to
establish the Union's majority.63
Thus, although the evidence in the two cases was strikingly similar, the
Bellwood court reached the opposite result from Tahoe Nugget and re-
fused to enforce the Board's bargaining order."
The approach taken in Stoner and Bellwood is preferable to that
used in Celanese and Tahoe Nugget. The policies underlying the Act
are best effectuated if the Board and the courts decide whether an in-
cumbent union has in fact retained its majority status. This approach
places the ultimate burden of proof on the party best situated to bear it,
so that the Board, as the trier of fact, is aided in its determination of the
majority-status issue. The Board's current approach of placing a heavy
burden on the employer to prove what it calls good-faith doubt may
result in the Board ordering an employer to bargain with a minority
union, merely because the employer is unable to prove that the union
lacks majority support. This result does not strike the balance between
the goals of employee free choice and industrial stability that the Act
contemplates.
able when an ultimate finding of an unfair labor practice and a resultant bargaining order have
such important consequences for the employees' section 7 rights." Id at 43 n.14.
62. The Tahoe Nugget court also endorsed a "cumulative" approach to the evidence. NLRB
v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 305 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). The
court was unable to apply this approach, however, because it did not focus on the employer's
good-faith doubt. Instead, it focused on whether there was an actual loss of majority support.
The cumulative weight of all of the evidence was therefore so low that it made little difference
whether the court classified its approach as "cumulative."
63. 627 F.2d at 104 (citations omitted).
64. Id at 105.
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Employee Free Choice.
The Board maintains that when an employer unilaterally termi-
nates the bargaining relationship with an incumbent union he abro-
gates the employees' statutory right to choose their bargaining
representative.6 5 The Board reasons that employees who are dissatis-
fied with their representation have other remedies at their disposal.66
Any time after the certification year, employees can file a decertifica-
tion petition alleging that the union is no longer supported by a major-
ity of the employees.67 If at least thirty percent of the employees in a
bargaining unit sign the petition, the Board conducts a decertification
election to determine whether the union has majority support.6 8
Reliance on the decertification procedure implicitly assumes that
such a petition is always an effective remedy for the employees. But
filing a petition, and mustering the requisite thirty percent showing of
interest, requires employee organization and initiative, as well as
knowledge that the procedure is available. In addition, most employ-
ees naturally seek to avoid falling into the incumbent union's disfavor,
which is the probable result of actively trying to oust the union. Thus,
the decertification election remedy is useful only in those cases in
which the employees are knowledgeable, organized, concerned and
courageous; it is therefore not sufficient by itself to safeguard the em-
ployees' right of free choice. Furthermore, the employer is in a much
better position to challenge an incumbent union's majority status. The
employer is likely to be aware of the available procedures, is obviously
concerned with the union's support, and is probably not afraid to chal-
lenge the union.
65. See NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 301 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In refusing to
bargain because of an alleged decline in union adherents, the employer is acting as vicarious
champion of its employees, a role no one has asked it to assume"), cer. denied, 442 U.S. 921
(1979); Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1978) ("the Board may strike the
balance more favorable toward the union when the union's status is challeged by the employer
rather than the employees themselves"); Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 491
(2d Cir. 1975) (the employer must meet a high standard of proof).
66. See NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 1973 (1981):
We have not failed to observe that.., the Board has favored continuity in the
bargaining structure over the enhancement of employee free choice. However, the
Board's [approach]. . . while not enhancing employee rights, does not adversely affect
those rights. As always, the employees may exercise their freedom of choice by petition-
ing the Board for an election ....
67. The employees' right to seek a decertification election is provided for in section
9(c)(l)(A)(ii) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1976).
68. See generally J. FEEicK, H. BAER & J. ARFA, NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-
LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (1980).
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The Board also maintains that an employer who entertains serious
doubts about the union's majority status after the certification year in-
fringes less on'employee free choice if he files an election petition and
continues to bargain instead of unilaterally terminating the bargaining
relationship.6 9 An election can resolve the issue of majority status
faster and more accurately.70 In United States Gypsum Co. ,71 however,
the Board held that an employer must show reasonable grounds for
doubting the incumbent union's status before the Board will conduct
an election at the employer's request.72 This standard has been inter-
preted as essentially equivalent to the good-faith-doubt test.73 An em-
ployer therefore has no incentive to use the election procedure instead
of simply refusing to bargain; the good-faith-doubt standard must be
satisfied in either case. If this were not so, the employer could harass
the incumbent union by arbitrarily compelling it to prove its continued
69. Section 9(c)(1)(B) gives the employer the right to file an election petition that questions
the incumbent union's majority status after the certification year. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1976).
70. Courts have suggested that an incumbent union's majority status should be determined
exclusively through elections rather than through unfair labor practice proceedings. Daisy's Orig-
inals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1972) held that an employer should be entitled to an
election in the incumbency context so long as he has satisfied the standards of NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The GLssel standards generally are applicable in the initial
recognition, rather than the incumbency, situation. As elaborated in Linden Lumber Div., Sum-
mer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974), Gissel holds that the employer does not have to recog-
nize a union initially unless the union has proved its majority status in a Board-conducted
election, so long as the employer has not committed serious unfair labor practices that have under-
mined the union's support. Essentially, Daisy's Originals advocates an election at the employer's
demand in the incumbency situation, so long as the employer has committed no significant unfair
labor practices. The Daisy's Originals court explained that an election, rather than a bargaining
order, is the preferred remedy for an unlawful refusal to bargain:
The remedy chosen. . .must be primarily remedial as opposed to punitive in nature
... and should not stand if it "is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those
which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.".. . In cases in which a
bargaining order has been deemed appropriate the employees have been stripped of their
§ 7 right to refuse unionization in order to remedy the wrongdoings of their employer.
The rationale of these cases has been that the employees' loss of rights is only temporary
(at a minimum of one year before a decertification petition can be filed.)
468 F.2d at 499 (citations omitted).
The Daisy'r Originals court believed that although the facts of Gissel were dissimilar, the
policy considerations were not. In NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1331 n.6 (3d Cir. 1970), the
court reached the opposite conclusion: "In the Gissel type of situation, the emphasis is on fulfil-
ling the national labor policy of assuring employees a free choice of representatives by the most
reliable method. In the case of withdrawal of recognition, however, competing considerations of
assuring the stability of an established bargaining relationship are involved."
For a suggestion that the Board apply the initial recognition standards in the incumbency
context, see Note, supra note 33.
71. 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966).
72. The employer must "demonstrate by objective considerations that it has some reasonable
grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority status since its certification." Id at 656.
73. See R. GonMAN, supra note 30, at 110.
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majority status.74 The Board's current standards, however, actually
discourage the employer from using the election procedure. Under Ce-
lanese a showing of good-faith doubt relieves the employer of his duty
to bargain, 75 whereas under Gypsum a showing of good-faith doubt
merely entitles the employer to an election.76 So long as the Board
discourages the use of employer election petitions they remain an insuf-
ficient safeguard of employee free choice.
The proposition that an employer impairs employee free choice by
terminating the bargaining relationship assumes that the incumbent
union commands majority support. Whether the incumbent union
commands such support is the very fact at issue in employer challenges
to majority status. If only a minority of the employees support the in-
cumbent union, an employer who terminates bargaining actually en-
hances employee free choice.77
In actuality the Board's current standard significantly infringes
upon employee free choice. If the employer does not satisfy the good
-faith-doubt test, the Board will order the employer to bargain with the
incumbent union. A bargaining order, however, implicitly directs the
employees to maintain the incumbent union as their bargaining repre-
sentative. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
recently described the effect of a bargaining order on employees:
After a bargaining order is entered, there is a "reasonable period,"
similar to the year after a Union is initially certified, during which no
decertification petition will be considered. Then, if a contract is
signed, which seems likely to occur in the course of a year of bargain-
ing, the three-year contract bar would stymie any attempt by the em-
ployees to choose another Union or decertify the present Union,
74. See Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1980):
The danger of permitting an employer to disrupt bargaining and continuously challenge
a Union's majority, diverting its attention and resources from representing the workers to
defending itself, requires a different standard from the one which governs initial recogni-
tion. Obviously, an automatic right to insist on an election, the procedure approved in
Linden Lumber for initial recognition cases, would not be appropriate in withdrawal of
recognition cases.
75. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
76. Election issues are decided by the Regional Directors, rather than the Board. Regional
Directors may apply a less stringent good-faith-doubt standard than the Board when an employer
has followed the "better practice" of filing for an election, rather than refused to bargain. See
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 n.18 (1954). Because of the significant number of employers
who choose refusal to bargain over filing an election petition, however, the election standard prob-
ably is not materially different from the unfair labor practice standard.
77. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 300 (9th Cir. 1978) ("If union support is
lacking, the employer's action actually furthers the cause of employee democracy by overcoming
the inertia which helps maintain the status quo"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
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unless the Board were to provide for an exception to its normal
rules.7
8
In contrast, the consequences of dismissing the union's refusal
-to-bargain charge are not particularly burdensome to either the em-
ployees or the union. Under the current Board standard, if the em-
ployer proves a "good-faith doubt" of the union's majority status, he
has no further duty to bargain with the union. The union is free, how-
ever, to attempt to reestablish its majority support by traditional meth-
ods. The union is in the same position as a union initially seeking to
organize an employee unit. If the union can procure signatures indicat-
ing support from thirty percent of the employees, it is entitled to an-
other certification election.79 Thus, erroneously deciding the majority-
status issue in favor of the union effectively forces a minority union
upon the employees, whereas dismissal merely requires the union to
reprove majority support.
Because a bargaining order has such important consequences for
employee free choice, the Board should not enter an order unless it
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the incumbent
union has majority support. By placing the burden on the employer to
disprove the union's majority status, the Board creates the substantial
possibility that a bargaining order will direct an employer to bargain
with a minority union, thereby contravening the statutory policy of em-
ployee free choice.80 An employer is in a difficult, if not impossible,
position to disprove an incumbent union's majority status.81 First, the
employer is required to prove a negative-that the union no longer
commands majority support.82 Second, as the Board explained in
Stoner, "[p]roof of majority is peculiarly within the special competence
of the union."'8 3 The employer has limited or no access to union files
and records. Moreover, the employer places himself in an extremely
78. Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35,45 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
Although the Board has stated that a bargaining order does not give rise to a presumption of
majority support, Squirrel Brand Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 289, 290-91 (1953), the order remains effective
at least until its purpose, which is to remedy the antecedent refusal to bargain, has been achieved.
Northwestern Photo Engraving Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1068 (1953).
Significantly, unions may have the authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements
without employee approval and therefore insulate themselves from attack of their majority status.
See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 404 (8th ed. 1977)
("So far as individual employees are concerned, collective bargaining resembles the legislative
process of a State or municipality").
79. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(A)(i) (1976).
80. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
81. Cf. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 301 (9th Cir. 1978) ("employer usually
does have inferior access to the relevant information and may risk further penalty in garnering
additional data"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
82. Guerdon Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 658, 664 (1975) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting).
83. 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 (1959). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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precarious position if he questions employees regarding their union
sentiment.8 4 Such questioning is inherently repugnant to employee free
choice and in many situations constitutes a violation of section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.85 An employer cannot, for instance, lawfully conduct a poll
of his employees to determine union sentiment unless the poll complies
with stringent procedural safeguards8 6 and the employer has a good
-faith doubt concerning the union's majority status.8 7 Since good-faith
doubt is a prerequisite to conducting a lawful poll, such a poll cannot
be used to establish good-faith doubt in either an election or an unfair
labor practice proceeding. An employer therefore is limited in the
kinds of evidence he can generate to disprove the union's majority sta-
tus; the evidence necessarily will be circumstantial and usually will be
equivocal.88
Certain kinds of evidence employers regularly use to attempt to
show good-faith doubt have been mentioned in connection with the
Tahoe Nugget case: employee statements of dissatisfaction with the
union, high rates of employee turnover, low union membership rates,
union inactivity, and union admissions of lack of membership.8 9 The
Board consistently has accorded little weight to this evidence, regarding
it as too equivocal to prove good-faith doubt.90 In addition, the ancil-
lary presumptions applied by the Board strip this kind of proof of any
84. See Bartenders, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B.
651, 657 (1974) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting) (it is legally indefensible for the Board to require
the employer to produce evidence that he could have obtained only through unlawful interroga-
tion).
85. See Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1067 (1967) ("any attempt by an employer
to ascertain employee views and sympathies regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of
reprisal in the mind of the employee if he replies in favor of unionism and, therefore, tends to
infringe on his Section 7 rights").
86. Id at 1063. The Board held:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed: (1) the
purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority, (2) this
purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4)
the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair
labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
87. Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717, 723 (1974).
88. In Bellwood the court characterized the employer's position:
To hold that the Hospital had no basis on which to justify a good faith doubt in the
present case would place the Hospital and other employers in an extremely difficult posi-
tion. On one hand, the evidence might not be held to amount to adequate support for a
good faith doubt; on the other hand, it might be an unfair labor practice for the employer
to bargain with a minority union in light of the cumulative evidence. . . and yet it might
also be an unfair labor practice for the employer to interview the employees regarding
their preferences.
Bellwood Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 98, 104 (7th Cir. 1980).
89. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 38-57 supra and accompanying text.
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value it may have in showing loss of majority support.91 The Board has
taken a similar approach with other kinds of evidence, including evi-
dence of poor strike support,92 proof that an employee decertification
petition has been filed (although this evidence usually receives some
consideration),93 and evidence of a close certification election. 94 This
approach effectively precludes the employer from showing loss of ma-
jority support, yet the Board continues to demand that the employer
shoulder this burden.95
91. Examples include the presumption that new employees support the union in the same
ratio as the workers they replace, see note 50 supra and accompanying text, and the presumption
that union membership is not equivalent to union support, see note 54 supra and accompanying
text.
92. Asserting that employees may support a union but not support a particular strike called
by that union, the Board has held that strike support is not a reliable indicator of union support
and is therefore entitled to little weight. The Board has noted that an employee may refuse to
support a strike because he is unable to afford the monetary loss, afraid of losing his job, or
conscientiously opposed to a particular strike. In each of these situations the employee may still
desire union representation. See West Sand & Gravel Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 931, 937, enforcement
denied, 612 F.2d 1326 (1st Cir. 1979); Servomation, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 975, 978 (1978) (lack of
strike support is not a sufficient "objective consideration" to support good-faith doubt). Some
courts have been more receptive than the Board to considering evidence of poor strike support.
Eg., NLRB v. Richard W. Kaase Co., 346 F.2d 24,31 (6th Cir. 1965). Contra, Rogers Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 486 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937 (1974).
93. The Board's approach in this area has not been consistent. In Telautograph Corp., 199
N.L.R.B. 892 (1972), the Board held that once a valid employee decertification petition had been
filed, raising a question concerning representation, the employer could not bargain further with
the union. Id at 893. The Board changed its position in Lammert Indus., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 895
(1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1978), holding that the filing of an employee decertifica-
tion petition was only one circumstance to be considered in the good-faith-doubt analysis. Al-
though one court has adopted the Telautograph approach, see National Cash Register Co. v.
NLRB, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974), most courts have endorsed the Lammert approach. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 628 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Retired Persons
Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486,490-91 (2d Cir. 1975); Rogers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 644,
647 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937 (1974). Although under Lammert the Board consid-
ers the decertification petition, the petition rarely is determinative since it need be supported by
only 30% of the unit employees, rather than by a majority.
94. The Board generally finds that evidence of a close certification election does not tend to
prove good-faith doubt. See, eg., Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforce-
ment denied, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966). But see Convair Div. of Gen. Dynamics Corp., 169
N.L.R.B. 131, 133 (1968) (that the union had won the election by only 22 votes in a unit consisting
of approximately 630 employees is probative of good-faith doubt). Some courts have considered
this kind of evidence. See NLRB v. Alvin J. Bart & Co., 598 F.2d 1267, 1271 (2d Cir. 1979) (a
close certification election renders the presumption of majority support weak at best); NLRB v.
Laystrom Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 799, 800 (7th Cir. 1966) (the election resulted in 17 votes for the
union, 13 against, and 2 ballots challenged); Capitol Aviation, Inc. v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 875 (7th
Cir. 1966) (a close certification election, 29 to 26, low strike support, and normal turnover estab-
lished good-faith doubt).
95. The Board has applied the presumption of majority support in two situations in which,
because of a rapid change in circumstances, the presumption arguably ought not to apply: when a
successor employer takes over the business enterprise, and when an employer withdraws from a
multi-employer bargaining unit. See Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357 (1976) (withdrawal
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An incumbent union is in a much better position than an employer
to prove majority support. In contrast to the employer's position, the
union can freely question employees about their union sentiment.96
Such questioning is not regarded as coercive of employee free choice
because the union's relationship with employees is different from the
employer's. 97 Because an employer controls the employee's livelihood,
he usually has considerable power over his employees. The implicit
threat of discharge is always present. Although the union may have
some control over the employees, it cannot fire them, at least directly.
Union questioning of employees therefore is not as oppressive as em-
ployer questioning. Furthermore, a union's awareness of the extent of
employee support is important in determining the union's bargaining
leverage in negotiations with the employer. Most unions, therefore,
probably are keenly aware of the extent of their support. Indeed, the
union benefits from keeping any loss of employee support confidential;
an employer cannot gain bargaining leverage if he does not know when
the union loses majority support. The union also has access to its own
files, which may aid it in determining the extent of employee support.
On balance, the union is in a much better position than the employer to
bear the burden of proof on the issue of majority status. The impor-
tance of correctly determining the majority-status issue should lead the
from multi-employer bargaining unit), enforced, 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 921 (1979); Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1970) (successor employer), enforced, 445
F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971).
The courts have supported the Board's application of the presumption in the successor-em-
ployer context. See NLRB v. Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc., 590 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1978); NLRB
v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964). But see Western Distrib. Co. v. NLRB,
608 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusing to apply the "ancillary-ratio presumption" to bind a suc-
cessor employer). See generally Note, The Successor Employer's Obligation to Bargain: Current
Problems in the Presumption of a Union's Majority Status, 8 FoRDnA URB. L.J. (1980); see also
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Some courts have supported the Board's application of the presumption of majority support
when the employer withdraws from a multi-employer unit in which an election was never held.
See NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 303 (9th Cir. 1978) (the presumption arises from
employer's voluntary recognition of the union), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). Other courts
have refused to apply the presumption with full force when it has never been shown that the
single-plant unit supports the union. See, e.g., W & W Steel Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 934, 939
(10th Cir. 1979) (the ballots of seven plants were commingled in the original multi-plant election);
NLRB v. Richard W. Kaase Co., 346 F.2d 24, 31 (6th Cir. 1965) (multi-employer election too
ambiguous to support a presumption of majority support in any single unit). Criticism of the
Board in this context also has come from within. See 227 N.L.R.B. at 359 (Walther, Member,
dissenting) (presumptions should not be employed when they fail to mirror reality).
96. R. GoRMAN, supra note 30, at 176 ("In contrast to the many decisions outlawing system-
atic interrogation by employers, it is clear that there is no such rule barring comparable interroga-
tion by unions and that unions are free to poll employees to gauge the extent of their support").
97. Springfield Discount, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 921, 921-22 n.4, enforced, 82 L.R.R.M. 2173 (7th
Cir. Nov. 30, 1972).
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Board to require the union to bear the burden of proof.98
The Board's current approach also infringes on employee free
choice when a group of employees has filed a decertification petition.99
Such petitions are held in abeyance if certain unfair labor practice
charges, including refusal-to-bargain charges, have been filed against
the employer. 1°° These unfair labor practice charges are known as
"blocking charges" because they temporarily block any attempt to hold
an election.'0 1 An election is not held until the unfair labor practice
charge is resolved. When an employee election petition is fied and the
employer discontinues bargaining, an incumbent union, unsure of its
majority status, probably will file a refusal-to-bargain charge to block
the election. In so doing the union hides its possible loss of majority
status behind the employer's burden of proof, rather than risking an
unfavorable election result. Under current Board standards the em-
ployer is often unable to satisfy this burden in the unfair labor practice
proceeding even when the union has lost majority support. In such a
case a bargaining order issues and the employee petition is not
processed further. The union succeeds in maintaining its representative
status although it no longer commands majority support. The employ-
ees are saddled with a representative they no longer desire.10 2 If the
Board places the burden of proof on the union, however, unions would
have little to gain by avoiding an election. A union's loss of majority
support probably would be exposed ineither an election or an unfair
labor practice proceeding.
98. In Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court stated that the
Board's current approach "run[s] a substantial risk of frustrating actual employee wishes simply
because the Board is not satisfied with the Company's ability to identify and articulate the reasons
for its doubt about the Union's support." Id at 44.
99. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
100. See J. FEERIcK, H. BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 68, at 233-36.
101. In Hod Carriers Local 840 (Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962), the Board
explained the underlying basis for the "blocking-charge doctrine":
A representation petition assumes an unresolved question concerning representa-
tion. A Section 8(a)(5) charge, on the other hand, presupposes that no such question
exists and that the employer is wrongfully refusing to recognize or bargain with a statu-
tory bargaining representative. Because of this basic inconsistency, the Board has over
the years uniformly refused to entertain representation petitions where a meritorious
charge of refusal to bargain has been filed and, indeed, has dismissed any repesentation
petition which may already have been on file.
Id at 1166 n.24.
102. See Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971) (characterizing
the blocking-charge doctrine as arbitrary in a case in which the employees' decertification petition
had been held in abeyance for over three years, and upholding the jurisdiction of the district court
to order the Board to process the petition); NLRB v. Minute Maid Corp., 283 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.
1960) (the Board is not relieved of its statutory duty to process a decertification petition merely
because an unproved unfair labor practice charge is filed against the employer).
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Requiring employers to prove that an incumbent union has lost its
majority support simply cannot be justified on the basis of promoting
employee free choice. Employee free choice is better preserved by
placing the burden of proving majority status on the union. To justify
its current approach, the Board must rely on the policy of industrial
stability.
B. Industrial Stability.
Maintaining the continuity of collective bargaining relationships
continues to be the primary means of promoting industrial stability.
Arguably, an approach making it difficult to unseat an incumbent
union, even if the union no longer enjoys majority support, is justified
because of the need for continuity. There is, after all, nothing sacred
about the principle of majority rule. For example, if only forty-nine
out of one hundred employees presently support an incumbent union,
the policy of industrial stability, as achieved through continuity in bar-
gaining relationships, might best be served if the employee group is
required to maintain the union as its representative. This argument
seems inherent in the current Board approach.10 3 At some point, how-
ever, the policy of promoting industrial stability is no longer served by
compelling recognition of a minority union. If only ten out of one hun-
dred employees support a union, for example, a bargaining order
would produce confusion and instability. The union would have very
little bargaining leverage in its dealings with the employer. An em-
ployer aware of such low union support would make few concessions to
the union at the bargaining table. Moreover, the union would have so
little control over the employees that it probably would not issue a
strike call, but instead would settle for whatever concessions it could
obtain from the employer. With such an ineffective bargaining repre-
sentative, the employer-employee relationship would exist as if the
union did not represent the employees at all. In this situation, main-
taining continuity does little to promote industrial stability.104
103. Although the Board relies on both industrial stability and employee free choice to sup-
port its approach, see note 35 supra, the Board's approach actually hinders free choice. See text
accompanying notes 78-95 supra. The approach must, therefore, ultimately find support in the
goal of promoting industrial stability.
104. Cf. Note, supra note 33, at 659-60. In discussing the presumption of majority support, the
note's author argues:
Concededly, the presumption is likely to preserve the status quo; however, the infer-
ence that preservation of the status quo is conducive to the industrial stability envisioned
by the NLRA is far from compelling. Typically the union has been inactive for months
or years prior to an employer's refusal to bargain [citing Tahoe Nugget and other cases].
While this type of bargaining relationship may create the appearance of industrial stabil-
ity inasmuch as it is unlikely to give rise to strikes or other economic warfare, the intent
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The point at which the goal of industrial stability is not served by
requiring an employer to bargain with a minority union varies, and it is
impossible to predict the effect of a bargaining order at the time it is
issued. If industrial stability were the only relevant policy, the Board
perhaps should be given discretion to decide when to issue a bargaining
order, and placing the burden of proof on the employer would be an
appropriate exercise of administrative discretion. Industrial stability is
not the only relevant policy, however, and it must always be weighed
against employee free choice.
C. The Balance Between Free Choice and Stability.
The Act states clearly that the goal of industrial stability must be
balanced against the employees' right to choose their bargaining repre-
sentative. 05 Both employee free choice and industrial stability are
safeguarded by sections 8(a)(2) 106 and 8(a)(5)10 7 of the Act. The
Supreme Court has interpreted section 8(a)(2) as generally prohibiting
employer recognition of a minority union.10 8 Section 8(a)(5) compels
recognition of a majority union. In theory the two sections are harmo-
nious, but an employer often cannot know whether he is dealing with a
minority or a majority union. In such situations the employer must
decide whether to continue bargaining, risking a violation of one of the
two sections if his decision is incorrect. The Board's task is to guide the
employer in the direction most closely satisfying the policies underlying
the Act.'0 9 The Board has ignored section 8(a)(2) in the incumbency
situation, however, by compelling the employer to resolve all doubts in
of the statute is to protect- only that industrial stability resulting from actual collective
bargaining with the employees' chosen representative. Thus, to the extent the Board's
presumption preserves bargaining relationships other than those envisioned by the stat-
ute, it cannot legitimately be based upon preservation of the status quo.
Id
105. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
106. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See note 10 supra.
108. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altman Tex. Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961). Although Bern-
hard-Alman is an initial-recognition case, the rule barring recognition of minority unions has
been applied in the incumbency situation. See Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 910
(1964). The exceptions to this general rule, most notably the "contract-bar" and "certification-
year" doctrines, are discussed at notes 115-21 infra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. Because section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976), in practice requires the employer to maintain the bargaining relationship if he
has only some doubt of the union's majority status, the section promotes industrial stability. Sec-
tion 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976), should have the opposite effect, forcing the employer to
resolve doubts against recognition. If the employer guesses correctly about the union's status
when he refuses to bargain, employee free choice is enhanced.
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favor of recognition in order to avoid an 8(a)(5) violation.' 10 In addi-
tion, by placing the burden of disproving majority status on the em-
ployer in 8(a)(5) cases, the Board has rendered section 8(a)(2)
ineffective in the incumbency context."'
The Board's discretion in fashioning remedies 12 and determining
substantive law is limited when the policies of the Act are relatively
clear." 3 In enacting the Act, Congress weighed employee free choice
against industrial stability and determined that the goal of employee
free choice outweighs the goal of industrial stability when a union no
longer commands majority support.1 4 The Board should not indepen-
dently weigh these two policies and apply a rule that is inconsistent
with the policy balance mandated by Congress.
The Board has contravened this mandate, however, by favoring
industrial stability over, employee free choice. To administer Con-
gress's espoused policy faithfully, the Board should apply a standard
that ensures an accurate determination of actual majority status. Re-
quiring the union to bear the burden of proving majority status accom-
plishes this goal.
The contract-bar doctrine and the certification-year rule, which
each limit employee free choice while promoting industrial stability,
are distinguishable from the Board's placing of the burden of proof on
the employer in the incumbent-union context. The contract-bar doc-
trine protects the union from an attack on its majority status by the
employer or the employees during the period of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, for a maximum of three years." 15 The certification-year
rule similarly protects the union during its initial year of recognition,
-110. This conclusion is supported by the dearth of reported decisions involving section 8(a)(2)
violations in the incumbency situation.
111. Another cause of the emasculation of this section in the incumbency context is the
Board's "knowledge requirement." The Board will not find the employer guilty of violating sec-
tion 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976), unless the employer has knowledge that the incumbent
union no longer commands majority support. See Campus Housekeeping, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No.
72, 105 L.R.R.M. 1527 (Sept. 29, 1980); Clark Equip. Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 660 (1980); Kenrich Pet-
rochemicals, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 910, 911 (1964) ("We rest our finding [of an 8(a)(2) violation]...
solely on the fact that ... the Company ... knew that the Union did not represent a majority of
the employees in the appropriate unit") (emphasis in original).
112. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964).
113. A Board order will not be enforced if "the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other
than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
114. The clearest statement of this congressional intent is found in section 9(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1976), see notes 4, 9supra, which provides that only representatives selected by a major-
ity of employees are entitled to exclusive recognition by the employer.
115. For a discussion of the contract-bar rule, see A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note
78, at 285-94.
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regardless of whether it has entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the employer.'1 6 Both doctrines are at least partially
designed to maintain industrial stability. By insulating the union
against attack for specified time periods, the Board gives it a chance to
prove itself worthy of its designation as representative of the bargaining
unit. After these periods the employees' evaluation of a union's per-
formance should be determinative. With regard to both doctrines, the
Board has had to weigh policies other than the promotion of employee
free choice and industrial stability. The contract-bar rule is in part the
product of the policy favoring the performance of contractual obliga-
tions."i7 Without such a rule, collective bargaining agreements would
have little meaning."" When a collective bargaining contract is en-
tered into, the union has the majority support of the employees and the
agreement therefore is binding on the employee unit. The employee
unit should not be allowed immediately to escape its contractual obli-
gations merely because it has changed its mind about its bargaining
representative.
Similarly, the certification-year rule is not based exclusively on
promoting the goal of industrial stability. The rule also ensures that
employees do not take elections for granted, but treat them as solemn
and serious occasions."l9 The rule promotes a sense of responsibility in
the employee electorate by providing for a minimum fixed term of
union representation, except under the most unusual circumstances. 120
In applying both the contract-bar and certification-year rules the
Board has not substituted its own policy views for Congress's. Rather,
the Board has created specialized factual exceptions to the majority
-rule principle based on policies that Congress failed to consider. In
contrast, by placing the burden of proving that the incumbent union
lacks majority support on the employer, the Board has directly contra-
vened Congress's policy determination that recognition of a minority
union is improper under the Act. This issue presents no relevant poli-
cies other than employee-free choice and industrial stability, and each
of these policies has been considered by Congress and provided for in
the Act.'2 '
116. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
117. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 78, at 285-94.
118. Id
119. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99 (1954).
120. Id
121. Another situation in which the Board will issue a bargaining order even though the union
no longer commands majority support is when an employer has undermined the union's support
through his own unfair labor practices. This situation is easily distinguished from the normal
incumbency situation, and a bargaining order is necessary here if the employer is not to profit by
DUKE LAW JOURM4L
IV. CONCLUSION
An employer should not be allowed to challenge a union's status
arbitrarily. Employers must be required to satisfy some evidentiary
burden to prevent harassment of the union by employer challenges to
the union's majority status.122 Application of the good-faith-doubt test
as used by the Board in Stoner and the court in Bellwood is war-
ranted.'2 3 If the employer cannot meet this minimal standard, the
Board is justified in entering a bargaining order. If, however, the em-
ployer's doubts are both reasonable and in good faith, the Board
should find that the presumption of majority support has been rebut-
ted, and should enter a bargaining order only if the union persuades
the Board that its majority status still exists. This standard of proof
strikes the proper balance, as determined by Congress, between the
goal of employee free choice and the goal of industrial stability.
The suggested approach probably will result in higher union turn-
over. Only those unions that truly command majority support will be
allowed to represent employees. Unsupported, albeit entrenched, un-
ions no longer will burden employee units simply because the unions
previously commanded majority support. The suggested approach
may even lead to less unionization. But under the Act the question of
unionization always has been left to those most significantly affected by
that determination: the employees. The Board has lost sight of this
consideration, forcing its preference for industrial stability upon em-
ployee units, rather than deferring to the employees and fulfilling its
congressionally-prescribed role.
Joel B. Toomey
his own wrongdoing. As far as the Board is concerned, when the effects of the employer's unfair
labor practices undermine employee support of the union, the union should be deemed still to
command majority support. See Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
122. See note 74 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 25, 63 supra.
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